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As part of its objective to create an eﬃcient common market, the European Union
has long undertaken a legal and political commitment to establish a common system
of commodity taxation based on the origin principle (commodities are taxed by—and
revenues accrue to—the country that produces them). The achievement of this objective
entails the shift from the current destination principle (commodities are taxed by—and
revenues accrue to—the country where consumption takes place) to the origin principle.
Central to the proposals of the European Commission has been the harmonization of
tax rates across member states.
Implicit in the proposal of the European Commission is that the two elements (the
shift of the tax principle and tax harmonization) are independent in the sense that the
implementation of the shift of the tax principle does not interfere (in welfare terms)
with the harmonization of tax rates across member states. This is indeed the case in
perfectly competitive markets. Keen (1987, 1989) establishes that with perfectly com-
petitive markets tax harmonization of destination-based taxes towards an appropriately
weighted average is potential Pareto improving (with appropriate compensating pay-
ments all countries gain from such a reform). Lopez-Garcia (1996) veriﬁes that origin-
based tax harmonization delivers Pareto improvements, too. The incorporation of public
goods does not aﬀect the desirability of tax harmonization. Delipalla (1997), incorpo-
rating public goods into the framework of Keen (1987, 1989), shows that, under certain
conditions, indirect tax harmonization under the destination principle leads to a potential
Pareto improvement. This issue is also taken up by Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (1998),
Lockwood (1997) and Lopez-Garcia (1998) who, under diﬀerent production technology
speciﬁcations, verify the desirability of destination-based tax harmonization. Recently,
Kotsogiannis, Lopez-Garcia and Myles (2004) have established conditions under which
origin-based tax harmonization, when the revenues from taxation are used for the pro-
vision of a public good, is Pareto improving.
The case of imperfectly competitive markets has also received some attention. The
evidence, however, as to the desirability of tax harmonization vis ` a vis the tax principle,
when revenue eﬀects are absent, is mixed: While destination-based tax harmonization
always makes one country better oﬀ and may be Pareto-improving (Keen and Lahiri
(1993), and Keen, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2002)) origin-based tax harmonization
is sure (under certain circumstances) to lead to a strict Pareto-worsening (Keen, Lahiri
and Raimondos-Møller (2002)).1 The welfare consequences of tax harmonization so
depend upon the tax principle in place. Seen from a policy perspective this is a striking
result. For this is ‘...a clear case in which...harmonization is unambiguously bad policy,’
Keen, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2002), p. 1561.2
The analysis of Keen, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2002) (thereafter KLR-M) assumes
that tax revenues are returned to consumers in a lump sum fashion. In reality, however,
1Keen and Lahiri (1998) investigate the welfare consequences of switching from the destination to
the origin principle. This analysis has been extended to include trade costs (Hauﬂer, Schjelderup and
Stahler (2000)), and product diﬀerentiation (Khovadaisi and Myles (2004)). There is an extensive
literature that compares destination and origin-based commodity taxes. Lockwood (2001) presents a
uniﬁed account of the early literature.
2Emphasis original.
1tax revenues collected from the imperfectly competitive sector are not returned in a lump
sum fashion to the consumers but are used for the provision of public goods and ser-
vices. This paper—in a framework that is essentially that of KLR-M (but appropriately
modiﬁed to deal with issues of public good provision)—shows that the welfare implica-
tion of tax harmonization, starting from the non-cooperative level of taxes, is in general
indeterminate, both under the destination and the origin tax principle. While this in-
determinacy is in general present under both tax principles, conditions are identiﬁed in
which it is resolved. The results of this paper so establish that in an oligopolistic market
the choice of the tax principle and the harmonization of tax rates across countries can
be considered in isolation when there are revenue eﬀects.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the background against
which the analysis is conducted. Section 3 deals with destination-based commodity
harmonization, while Section 4 deals with origin-based tax harmonization. Section 5
summarizes and concludes.
2 The background
The model features two countries conveniently called ‘home’ and ‘foreign’ (variables
speciﬁc to the latter country being indicated by an asterisk) with a single representative
consumer residing in each. Each country has a single factor of production which produces,
under conditions of constant return to scale, a tradeable good.3 This good is taken as the
numeraire in both countries. Additionally, in each country there is a single ﬁrm producing
a tradeable homogeneous good. The consumer price for this good in the home (foreign)
country is denoted by Q (Q∗). Demand for this good—denoted by D (D∗) in the home
(foreign) country—is assumed to be linear, with, in particular, zero income eﬀects but
slope and intercept that are allowed to diﬀer between the two countries, that is





where α, α∗ and β, β∗ are strictly positive parameters.
Both ﬁrms have linear cost structures given by C = cX + F (C∗ = c∗X∗ + F ∗), where
X (X∗) is the quantity produced by the home (foreign) ﬁrm, and c (c∗) is the, strictly,
positive marginal cost and F (F) is the, strictly, positive ﬁxed cost of the home (foreign)
ﬁrm.
The tradeable good may be supplied by a ﬁrm from either the home or the foreign
country and so either country can be an exporter or importer of the tradeable good.
Market clearing for the world, however, requires that
D + D
∗ = X + X
∗ . (2)
We now turn to, starting from the destination, the two principles of taxation.
3The single factor of production is ﬁxed in supply and is, therefore, suppressed in the analysis.
23 Destination principle of taxation
With both countries following the destination principle of taxation, arbitrage requires
that producer prices—denoted by P (P ∗) for the home (foreign) country—across coun-
tries are equalized that is, P = P ∗ ≡ Pw. Consumer prices are then given by
Q = Pw + td ; Q




d) is the speciﬁc tax rate on consumption in the home (foreign) country.
Proﬁts accrued to the monopolistic ﬁrm in the home (foreign) country are denoted by
Π (Π∗) and given by
Π = (Pw − c)X − F ; Π




The revenues obtained from taxing the commodity in each country is used to provide a
non-tradeable public good denoted by G (G∗) in the home (foreign) country given by





The per-unit cost of public good is, for simplicity, ﬁxed and, without loss of generality,
is normalized to 1. Substituting (3) into (1) and that into (2) one obtains the aggre-
gate inverse demand function that relates the world price Pw to global production and
consumption taxes, that is
Pw = b[(α + α
∗) − (βtd + β
∗t
∗
d) − (X + X
∗)] , where b ≡ 1/(β + β
∗) . (6)
Firms maximize proﬁts, taking the ﬁscal instruments as given, with—following from (4)
and (6)—necessary conditions
Pw − bX = c ; Pw − bX
∗ = c
∗ , (7)
and equilibrium proﬁts, following again from (4),
Π = bX




Proﬁts in each country accrue to the representative consumer of that country, and so
income in the home (foreign) country is Y = Π (Y ∗ = Π∗).
Indirect utility in the home (foreign) country is of the form










where S(Q) (S∗(Q∗)) is the consumer’s surplus (the utility obtained from purchasing the
private good at price Q), and Γ(G) (Γ∗(G∗)) is the utility from the public good in the
home (foreign) country. For the main results, the exact speciﬁcation of the functions Γ
and Γ∗ is unimportant. It will be instructive, however, later on—in order to remove the
dependency of the impact of the reforms on the marginal valuation for the public good—
to assume that Γ(G) = ¯ ΓG (Γ∗(G∗) = ¯ Γ∗G∗) implying that the marginal valuation for
the public good in the home (foreign) country does not vary with the revenues raised
from the taxes levied on the imperfectly produced good.
The eﬀect on home welfare4 of an arbitrary reform, following from (9), then, is
dV = (X − D)dPw + (Pw − c)dX + (Γ
′ − 1)Ddtd + Γ
′td dD . (10)
4Where appropriate the expressions for the foreign country, being similar to the home ones, are
omitted.
3Home utility is, clearly, aﬀected by four eﬀects: The ﬁrst is the, familiar enough, terms
of trade eﬀect. The second reﬂects the production eﬃciency of the home ﬁrm. The
third eﬀect reﬂects the deviation of public good provision from the level associated with
the Samuelson rule (Γ′ = 1), a deviation that reﬂects both the cost (since for given
world price a change in the home tax reduces home demand) and beneﬁt of public good
provision (since any extra revenues accrued due to a change in the home tax is spend
on the home public good valued, at the margin, by Γ′). Finally, the fourth eﬀect, too,
relates to public good provision: A change in demand, at initial taxes, changes revenues
valued again, at the margin, by Γ′.
To address the welfare eﬀects of the tax reform one needs to relate the change of welfare
to the instruments of tax policy. Making use of (1), (2) and (7), one obtains
Pw = 1/3{b(α + α
∗) − b(βtd + β
∗t
∗
d) + (c + c
∗)} , (11)
X = 1/3b{b(α + α
∗) − b(βtd + β
∗t
∗
d) + (c − 2c
∗)} , (12)
X
∗ = 1/3b{b(α + α




∗ − 2c)} , (13)
with, for later use, perturbations
dPw = −(b/3)[βdtd + β
∗dt
∗
d] ; dX = dX




























Expression (15) and its foreign analogue are at the heart of the analysis that follows.
A tax harmonizing reform that has the features noted in the introduction—a convergence
of the initial taxes towards a common target-tax and the common target-tax being a








ψ (H − td)




where δ is a small positive scalar, ψ,ψ∗ are arbitrary positive numbers and H is the














Clearly, the common target-tax H lies between the initial tax rates.5
5This is the generalization—proposed by Lopez-Garcia (1998), and used in Kotsogiannis, Lopez-
Garcia and Myles (2004)—of the seminal reform of Keen (1987, 1989). It includes as a particular case
that of Keen (1987, 1989), Keen and Lahiri (1993), and KLR-M: This is the case if ψ = ψ∗ = 1.










ψβ + ψ∗β∗ , (18)





The implication of this latter relationship is that, following (14), world-producer price is
unaﬀected by the reform and so is the supply of the tradeable good in each country.
Having described the tax-harmonizing reform being used we are now in a position to
evaluate its impact on welfare. Two welfare criteria are, typically, used: Potential Pareto
improvement in the sense that dV + dV ∗ > 0 (the country that gains compensates,
implicitly, the country that loses from the reform), and actual Pareto improvements
implying that dV,dV ∗ > 0 (and so both countries gain without the need of international
compensation). We start with the former.
Adding expressions (15) and its foreign analogue, and making use of (18), the eﬀect of



















Close inspection of (20) reveals that it cannot be readily signed. This diﬃculty arises
from the second and third terms in (20) which capture the revenue impact of the change
of the tax bases in the two countries. Clearly, one could be tempted to ﬁnd suﬃcient
conditions that ensure dV + dV ∗ > 0. Though this is a clear possibility, this task does
not seem to oﬀer a promising avenue in identifying reasonable and easily interpretable
conditions under which tax harmonization delivers a potential Pareto improvement. To
progress a bit further on this suppose, for instance, that the rule for public good provision
in both countries follows the Samuelson rule and so Γ′,Γ∗′ = 1. It is clear, then, that in
this case dV + dV ∗ > 0 and so the tax harmonizing reforms deliver a potential Pareto
improvement. This is intuitive. As noted previously the tax harmonizing reforms imply
that the supply of output in both countries, and so world price, remain ﬁxed at the
pre-reform level. With the supply of output ﬁxed, so is consumers’ welfare derived from
proﬁts (see (8) and (9)). What is left, therefore, is the change in the deadweight loss
from consumption. But this confers an unambiguous gain to the consumers: For, with
the world price unchanged, global deadweight loss is reduced by convergence towards
a weighted average of the initial taxes. Notice that this is the exact analogue of Keen
and Lahiri (1993), and KLR-M carrying over unchanged to the case where tax revenues
ﬁnance public goods.
Suppose now, to see another possibility, that both countries have symmetric preferences
for the private and the public good with, in particular, Γ′, Γ∗′ = ¯ Γ. This is, clearly,
a restrictive speciﬁcation that conveniently removes the dependency of the impact of
the reforms on the preferences for the public goods. But it is nevertheless a valuable
case to consider since it vividly brings out the main forces at work.6 In this case (20)
6See also Keen and Lahiri (1998) for a similar restriction on the marginal valuation for public good.
5reduces to7 dV +dV ∗ = δ¯ βψψ∗(t∗
d−td)2 ¡
2¯ Γ − 1
¢
/(ψ+ψ∗) and so the tax harmonizing
reforms in (16) and (17) attain a potentially Pareto improvement (worsening) if and
only if ¯ Γ > (<)1/2. The marginal valuation for the public good, then, emerges as the
crucial determinant of the welfare consequences of the tax harmonizing reforms. There
is a simple intuition behind this. Tax harmonization has three eﬀects; the ﬁrst eﬀect
relates to the change in global deadweight loss, the second to the change in global tax
revenues, and the third to the change in the global cost of providing the public goods.
The ﬁrst eﬀect clearly leaves consumer welfare unchanged. For, with both countries
having the same preferences for the private good, and with tax harmonization dictating
that the changes in taxes should be equal in absolute value,8 the reduction in deadweight
loss in the high tax country is equal to the increase in the deadweight loss of the low
tax country. Second, tax harmonization strictly increases global tax revenues.9 For, in
this case, the gain in tax revenues of the low tax country more than oﬀsets the loss
in revenues of the high tax country. Finally, the global cost (equivalent to the loss in
revenue at unchanged demand) of providing the public goods has increased. It is the
sum of these two latter eﬀects, (a sum that depends of course on the marginal valuation,
given—it will be recalled—by ¯ Γ, of the global tax revenues raised) that gives rise (or
not) to the potential Pareto changes.
Unfortunately, outside of these two special cases the evaluation of the reforms in (16) and
(17), starting from any tax equilibrium t∗
d  = td, is admittedly a diﬃcult task. Naturally
then one might ask whether, by restricting taxes to those arising from Nash equilib-
rium, the harmonizing reforms in (16) and (17) can deliver potential and actual Pareto
improvements when the countries have diﬀerent preferences for the private and/or the
public good. Surprisingly, in this case too, there is not a clear cut answer. To see this
notice that Nash equilibrium level of taxes (denoted by tN
d for the home country and t∗N
d
for the foreign) are given, for the home country, by setting the coeﬃcient of dt in (15),




d = Z {(D − 2X) + 3(Γ
′ − 1)D/βb} , with Z ≡ 1/Γ
′ (2β + 3β









∗b} , with Z
∗ ≡ 1/Γ
∗′(2β
∗ + 3β) > 0 . (22)
Public good provision in both countries rules out negative non-cooperative equilibrium
taxes. Suppose that, without loss of generality, the home country is the exporter of the
good and so D < X. Then, following (21), for tN
d > 0, Γ′ > 1 must be the case. Turing
now to (22) one notices that t∗N
d > 0 does not restrict the marginal valuation for public
good provision in the foreign country. Even if Γ∗′ > 1 it may be that t∗N
d > 0 either
because D∗ < 2X∗ or D∗ ≥ 2X∗. If, however, Γ∗′ < 1 then D∗ > 2X∗ must be the case.
Evaluating now (15), at the Nash equilibrium level of taxes given by (21) and (22), the













7This straightforwardly follows after noting, following (1), that (D/¯ β − D∗/¯ β) = (t∗
d − td), where
¯ β ≡ β = β∗,
8This readily follows from setting equal weights in (19).
9It is easy to see this. Perturbation of global revenues, denoted by Ω, gives dΩ = tddD + Ddtd +
t∗
ddD∗ + D∗dt∗
d. Making now use of (1), the fact that dtd = −dt∗
d, (D/¯ β − D∗/¯ β) = (t∗
d − td) and (18),
the change in global revenues is given by dΩ = 2δ¯ βψψ∗ (t∗
d − td)
2 /(ψ + ψ∗) > 0.
6A word of clariﬁcation is in order here. Recall that the tax coordinating reform in (16)
and (17) keeps the world-producer price, and so domestic supply, of the tradeable good
ﬁxed. Nevertheless, the home country welfare, as an envelope property, is aﬀected by
three eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect, the magnitude of which is D − X, relates to the terms of
trade, the second, given by −X, relates to the change in proﬁts whereas the third relates
to the change in revenues, valued at the margin by Γ′, caused by a change in the home
demand. A similar reasoning applies to the foreign country.
An interesting feature of (23) (and its foreign counterpart) is that the eﬀect of tax
harmonization on welfare is indeterminate. To see this, substituting (21) and (22) into

























Close inspection of (24) and (25) reveals that, in conjunction with the possible restrictions
on the marginal valuation for the public goods discussed after (22), they can have any
sign and in particular both countries may be better oﬀ (consistent with the results in
KLR-M) or worse oﬀ (in contrast to the results in KLR-M). It is precisely the presence of
public goods that makes the achievement of actual Pareto improvements indeterminate.10
Summarizing:
Proposition 1 Starting from the Nash equilibrium level of taxes tN
d  = t∗N
d and with
tax revenues in both countries being used to ﬁnance public good provision, no general
conclusion can be derived concerning the welfare eﬀects of the destination-based tax har-
monization in (16)-(17): Both countries can be either better oﬀ or worse oﬀ.
Proposition 1 is so in sharp contrast to that of KLR-M who show that if revenues are
returned to the consumer in a lump-sum fashion then tax harmonization entails an actual
Pareto improvement. This, however, may no longer hold if revenues eﬀects are accounted
for.11
It is so clear from the preceding discussion that the welfare consequences of the harmo-
nizing reforms in (16)-(17), when public goods are present, can only be determined once
10This is, of course, outside the cases discussed after (20).
11Although the indeterminacy of the welfare impact of tax harmonization is clear enough from the dis-
cussion preceding Proposition 1, it is instructive to provide a simple example that shows the possibility,
in particular, that destination-based tax harmonization can be, in contrast to KLR-M, Pareto-worsening.
To see this suppose that both countries have identical preferences for the private good with, in particular,
α = α∗ = 10 and β = β∗ = 1.5, but the home country’s marginal valuation for the public good, Γ′ = 1.1
is less than that of the foreign, Γ∗′ = 2. (All numbers have been rounded to three decimal points. In
this example and in that of footnote 14 we have set, for simplicity, F = F∗ = 0.) Suppose also that the
home country is more eﬃcient in producing the tradeable good than the foreign one in the sense that
c = 2 < c∗ = 4. Using now (1), (11)-(13) and (21)-(22), one obtains D = 3.091, D∗ = 3.047, X = 0.069,
X∗ = 6.069, Pw = 4.023, and tN
d = 0.583, t∗N
d = 0.613, and so the exporting country (foreign) sets a
higher tax than the importing one (home). Positing now reform parameters, δ = 0.8 and ψ = ψ∗ = 1,
tax harmonization, following (18), entails changing of taxes according to dtd = 0.012 = −dt∗
d. Fol-
lowing (24)-(25) the change in welfare in the home and the foreign counties, respectively, are given by
dV = −0.008, dV ∗ = −0.014, and so both countries are hurt by tax harmonization. Examples in which
the reform deliver a Pareto-improvement do also exist.
7the preferences for the private and public good are known. Without speciﬁc knowledge of
the parameters underlying these preferences there is no unambiguous answer to whether
destination-based tax harmonization is something that should be avoided or welcome.
This, of course, does not make, a priori, destination-based harmonization a bad pol-
icy, but it merely suggests that it should be exercised with caution in a imperfectly
competitive market in which there are revenue eﬀects.
We now turn to the origin principle of taxation.
4 Origin principle of taxation
The analysis in the case of origin-based taxes parallels that of the destination-based
taxes. We brieﬂy state the necessary modiﬁcations of the model to deal with this case.
Origin-based taxes are levied by (and revenues accrue to) the country in which the
commodity is produced. International arbitrage dictates that consumer prices across
countries are equalized and so Q = Q∗ = Qw. Denoting to (t∗
o) the speciﬁc tax in the
home (foreign) ﬁrms maximize
Π = (Qw − to − c)X − F ; Π






Using (1) and (2) aggregate inverse demand is
Qw = b[(α + α
∗) − (X + X
∗)] . (27)
Proﬁts maximization requires





Revenues are used to provide public goods





Equations (2) and (28) solve for
Qw = (1/3){b(α + α
∗) + (c + c
∗) + (to + t
∗
o)} , (30)
X = (1/3b){b(α + α
∗) + (c
∗ − 2c) + (t
∗
o − 2to)} , (31)
X
∗ = (1/3b){b(α + α
∗) + (c − 2c
∗) + (to − 2t
∗
o)} , (32)
with, for later use, perturbations
dQw = (1/3)[dto+dt
∗






Notice, for later use, following from (31) and (32), that
X
∗ − X = (1/b){(c − c
∗) + (to − t
∗
o)} . (34)
With income given by Y = Π (Y ∗ = Π∗) and indirect utility given by (9) the eﬀect on
home (foreign) welfare of an arbitrary reform is
dV = (X − D)dQw + (Qw − to − c)dX + (Γ
′ − 1)Xdto + Γ
′to dX . (35)
8To address the welfare eﬀects of a tax harmonizing reform we relate the change of welfare






















It is expression (36), and its foreign analogue, that form the basis of the analysis in this
Section. We turn now to a discussion of origin-based tax harmonizing reforms and to a
search of both potential and actual Pareto improvements.








ψ (H − to)

































Notice that the implication of (40) is that, following (33), world-consumer price is unaf-
fected, and as a consequence both countries’ demands are unaﬀected too. This parallels
the discussion of the destination principle.12

















As with the destination principle, the level of generality of (41) posses a signiﬁcant
problem in the attempt to evaluate the welfare consequence of the origin-based tax
harmonizing reforms in (37) and (38). It is easy to see, however, that in this case, too,
there are two instances in which the reforms, starting from a tax-distorted equilibrium
t∗
o  = to, clearly attain potential Pareto improvements. The ﬁrst possibility is when both
countries follow the Samuelson rule in the sense that Γ′,Γ∗′ = 1. Inspection of (41)
reveals that, in this case, dV + dV ∗ > 0 if and only if the high tax country is also the
country with the lower marginal cost of producing the tradeable good that is, if and
only if (c − c∗)(t∗
o − to) > 0. This is intuitive. Notice that, as already noted, the tax
harmonizing reform ensures that the world-consumer price remains at its pre-reform level
12It is also worth noting that, following Lopez-Garcia (1996), one would expect equally that local
supply responses (which would be the counterpart of the local demand responses that act as the weights
to the taxes in the harmonizing reform in the destination principle) would appear here as the basis for
tax harmonization. This, however, is not the case. Nevertheless, the harmonizing reform has the same
eﬀects on world-consumer price and, therefore, on demands.
9and, as a consequence, demands in both countries remain unchanged. What changes,
however, is production in both countries. Suppose, without loss of generality, that t∗
o > to
and so it is the foreign that is the high tax country and so that c > c∗. In this case,
the harmonizing reforms call for a reduction in the foreign tax (the eﬃcient one) and
an increase in the home tax (the less eﬃcient one) and so a reallocation of production,
following (33), from the less eﬃcient to the more eﬃcient country. This, it has to be
said, is the exact analogue of KLR-M carrying unchanged to the case in which public
goods are provided according to the Samuelson rule.
Consider now the possibility that both countries value equally, at the margin, the public
good in the sense that Γ′,Γ∗′ = ¯ Γ, and that both ﬁrms face the same marginal cost of
producing the tradeable good in the sense that c = c∗.13 In this case (41), after making
use of (34), reduces to dV + dV ∗ = 2ψψ∗(t∗
o − to)2(¯ Γ − 1)/b(ψ + ψ∗) and so the tax
harmonizing reforms in (37) and (38) entail a potential Pareto improvement (worsening)
if and only if ¯ Γ > (<)1. Clearly, in this case too, the marginal valuation of public goods
emerges as a critical determinant for the evaluation of the harmonizing reforms. This is
intuitive. The tax harmonizing reforms strictly increase global tax revenues and so, with
both countries valuing the public good equally, at the margin, this is welfare enhancing.
But global deadweight loss also increases. To see this, suppose, without loss of generality,
that the home country supplies more of the tradeable good in the world market and so
X > X∗. In this case, following (34), t∗
o > to; the high tax country (foreign) is the country
with the low supply of the tradeable good. With the world consumer price being Qw it
is, of course, the case that P > P ∗. It is, then, easy to see that—since tax harmonization
requires the change in taxes to be of equal magnitude—global deadweight loss increases.
Global production, too, decreases. Clearly, then, the welfare consequences of the origin-
based tax harmonizing reforms critically depend on the marginal valuation of the public
good ¯ Γ.
Outside these, admittedly, very special cases evaluation of (41) is a diﬃcult task and
suﬃcient conditions ensuring dV + dV ∗ > 0 are not very instructive. As before one
may then, naturally, ask: Does a restriction of taxes to those attained at the Nash
equilibrium allow us to progress further on the evaluation of the welfare consequences,
especially those related to actual Pareto improvements, of the harmonizing reforms in
(37) and (38). Restriction of taxes to those arising from non-cooperative behaviour
typically allows for the harmonizing reforms to deliver actual Pareto improvements.
Surprisingly, however, with public goods the answer to this is again ambiguous. To see
this ﬁrst notice that, following (36) and its foreign counterpart, the Nash equilibrium
level of taxes denoted by tN
o and t∗N




′){−(D + X) + 3(Γ









With positive public good provision, and so tN
o ,tN∗
o > 0, it must be that case that—
following −(D +X) < 0, and −(D∗ +X∗) < 0—both the home and the foreign country
marginal valuation must exceed 1 that is, Γ′,Γ∗′ > 1.
13This, of course, requires that demands for the private good are not symmetric. For in this case, the
only tax-distorted equilibrium would be the symmetric one.














It is worth noting here, too, that although the origin-based tax harmonizing reform in
(37) and (38) keeps the world-consumer price, and so domestic demand for the tradeable
good ﬁxed, home (foreign) welfare is aﬀected, as an envelope property, by the eﬀects:
the terms of trade eﬀect, −(D−X), the eﬀect through proﬁts, given by X, and the eﬀect
through the change in revenues valued at the margin by Γ′.
Interestingly, (44) (and its foreign counterpart) has the feature that the eﬀect of tax
harmonization on welfare is, too, indeterminate. To see this, re-write (by explicitly
























which clearly both have indeterminate signs. This so, too, reveals that starting from
the Nash equilibrium level of taxes, in general, no conclusion can be derived regarding
whether the origin-based tax harmonizing reform in (37) and (38) in the presence of
public goods can deliver an actual Pareto improvement. To emphasize this:
Proposition 2 Starting from the Nash equilibrium level of taxes tN
o  = t∗N
o and with
tax revenues being used to ﬁnance public goods, no general conclusion can be derived
concerning the welfare eﬀects of the origin-based tax harmonizing reform in (37) and
(38): Both countries can be either better oﬀ or worse oﬀ.
Proposition 2 is, too, in sharp contrast to the cases analyzed in KLR-M that show that
if revenues are returned to the consumer in a lump-sum fashion then origin-based tax
harmonization entails an actual Pareto worsening.14
Though, starting from the Nash equilibrium level of taxes, there is no general conclusion
regarding actual Pareto improvements it is possible for the reforms to deliver potential
Pareto improvements. One such instance is when preferences for the private good are
the same in both countries, and so D = D∗, and that both countries value equally the
14Although, here, too, the indeterminacy of the welfare impact of tax harmonization is clear enough
from the discussion in the text, it is instructive to provide a simple example that transparently shows
the possibility that origin-based tax harmonization can be Pareto-improving. Consider the case in
which both countries have identical preferences for the private good with, in particular, α = α∗ = 10
and β = β∗ = 1.5, and the home country values more than the foreign one the public good in the
sense that Γ′ = 3, Γ′∗ = 2. Suppose also that the home country is also less eﬃcient in producing the
tradeable good with, in particular, c = 4 > c∗ = 2. Using (1), (30)-(32) and (42)-(43) one obtains
D = D∗ = 3.287, X = 1.077, X∗ = 5.498, Qw = 4.475 and tN
d = 0.116 and t∗N
d = 0.642. It is
clear then that in this case the home country (which is the less eﬃcient country one) sets a lower tax in
equilibrium than the foreign country. In this case origin-based tax harmonization, following (39), entails
tax changes according to dtN
o = 0.048 = −dt∗N
o . Changes in welfare, following (45)-(46), are then given
by dV = 0.001, dV ∗ = 0.184. Examples with reasonable restrictions on the parameters in which the
reforms deliver a Pareto-worsening are easy to construct.
11public good in the sense that Γ′ = Γ∗′ = ¯ Γ.15 In this case adding—after making use of




















Subtracting now (42) from (43), after using (34), one obtains t∗N
o −tN
o = [(3¯ Γ−4)/(5¯ Γ−
4)](c−c∗). Substituting now this latter expression into (47), after some straightforward
manipulations, one obtains
dV + dV
∗ = φ¯ Γ
2 ¡
3¯ Γ − 4
¢
/(5¯ Γ − 4)
2 , (48)
where φ ≡ [2¯ βψψ∗ (c − c∗)
2]/(ψ + ψ∗) > 0, with β = β∗ = ¯ β. Clearly, then—following
from the observation that for tN
o ,tN∗
o > 0, ¯ Γ > 1 is required—dV + dV ∗ > 0 if and only
if ¯ Γ > 4/3 and dV + dV ∗ < 0 if ¯ Γ ∈ (1,4/3). Summarizing:
Proposition 3 Starting from the Nash equilibrium level of taxes t∗N
o  = tN
o , and assuming
that both countries have the same preferences for the private and public good, the tax
harmonizing reforms in (37) and (38) are potentially Pareto improving if and only if
¯ Γ > 4/3. They are potential Pareto worsening if and only if ¯ Γ ∈ (1,4/3).
In this case, too, the welfare consequences of the reforms in (37) and (38) critically
depend on the marginal valuation of the public good.
5 Concluding remarks
KLR-M has shown recently that in an oligopolistic situation the welfare consequences
of tax harmonization (the convergence of tax rates towards a common tax vector) criti-
cally depend on the tax principle under consideration: Destination-based harmonization
of commodity taxes, starting from the non-cooperative equilibrium, always makes one
country better of and may be Pareto-improving, whereas origin based tax harmonization
leads to a strict Pareto-worsening. An important element, however, missing from the
analysis of KLR-M is revenue eﬀects.
This paper has introduced public goods in the framework of KLR-M and, in pass-
ing, has identiﬁed conditions under which, starting from any tax-distorted equilibrium,
destination- and origin-based tax harmonizing reforms are potential welfare improving.
Moreover, restricting taxes to those arising from non-cooperative behaviour, the wel-
fare consequences of tax harmonizing reforms under both principles (without further
restrictions on preferences), have been shown to be indeterminate.
The results of this paper then suggest that, contrary to conclusion of KLR-M, (a) the
choice of the tax principle and (b) the harmonization of tax rates across countries, can
be considered in isolation when there are revenue eﬀects. In particular, in a model of
international oligopoly, the general indeterminacy concerning the welfare implications of
(b) holds in spite of the choice in (a): Starting from a non-cooperative equilibrium, both
countries can be either better oﬀ or worse oﬀ after a harmonizing reform regardless of
the tax principle.
15Notice, in particular, that no assumption is made on the marginal cost of producing the tradeable
good faced by both ﬁrms. Since c  = c∗, this case is distinctively diﬀerent from the case discussed after
(41).
12A precise evaluation of tax-harmonizing policies would require explicit calibration of the
speciﬁc equilibrium and the harmonizing reforms arising from such an equilibrium. This
is certainly an avenue of research that is worth taking.
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